Cristián Sánchez
Cristián Sánchez, Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics at Universidad de los Andes

I am a Visiting Assistant Professor at Universidad de los Andes.

I am an applied microeconomist, interested in the study of the efficient allocation of public resources, and in the effectiveness of public policies. My work combines quasi-experimental methods with equilibrium modeling to understand how schools, firms, and individuals respond to government intervention, with a focus on education, labor and credit markets in Latin America.

Fields  Public Economics · Industrial Organization · Economics of Education · Labor Economics

Selected work

A few representative papers — the full list is on Research.

Equilibrium Consequences of Vouchers Under Simultaneous Extensive and Intensive Margins Competition
R&R (2nd round) · Journal of Political Economy
I study supply-side responses to a targeted voucher program with voluntary school participation, combining administrative data from Chile with an equilibrium model of school demand and competition. The policy induces market segmentation: lower-quality schools opt in and reduce fees, while higher-quality schools opt out and raise them. Low-income students face lower prices and modest quality gains; higher-income students shift toward non-participants. Budget-neutral redesigns improve the quality mix of participating schools but yield limited gains for low-income students, given their low willingness to pay for school attributes. Only mandated participation delivers appreciable gains, at higher fiscal cost.
@unpublished{sanchez2026equilibrium,
  author = {Cristián Sánchez},
  title  = {{Equilibrium Consequences of Vouchers Under Simultaneous Extensive and Intensive Margins Competition}},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Working paper}
}
The Gender Pay Gap in a Highly Regulated Market
with Paola Bordón, Ricardo Estrada and Miguel Sarzosa
This paper studies gender pay disparities in Mexico's public-school system, a highly regulated labor market with standardized pay schedules and centralized wage setting. Using administrative payroll data from 2016 to 2024, we compare teachers in identical positions within the same school to estimate gender differences in pay for equal work. Comparing teachers of the same age, we find an equal-work wage gap of 0.018 log points. Because women are more often recent entrants than men of the same age, this gap falls to 0.008 log points when we control for seniority. Women's slower progression through a horizontal promotion system accounts for the remainder. The gender gap in total earnings is larger than the equal-work wage gap, at 0.036 log points, because men are more likely to hold multiple positions and because their second positions are relatively better paid. The equal-work wage gap is concentrated among teachers aged 50 and older, and between 2016 and 2024 the gaps in wage rates, total earnings, and multiple-job holding all move against women only among teachers born in 1965–69. We also show that, by about half a year after birth, motherhood reduces women's total earnings and wage rates by 0.05 and 0.04 log points, respectively. It reduces the number of teaching jobs they hold by 0.03, as their second positions end more often and those with one position start another less often.
@unpublished{bordon2026gender,
  author = {Paola Bordón and Ricardo Estrada and Cristián Sánchez and Miguel Sarzosa},
  title  = {{The Gender Pay Gap in a Highly Regulated Market}},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Working paper}
}
Selection in Crisis Lending: Evidence from Chile's Government-Guaranteed Loans
with Lautaro Chittaro
We study the long-run effectiveness of government-guaranteed loan programs implemented during recent crises. Using administrative and loan application data from the Central Bank of Chile, we track firm defaults five years after the COVID-19 shock. Our instrumental-variable estimates show that these loans postponed defaults for two years but did not reduce total defaults in the long run. Banks used private information to direct credit toward firms that would have been safer even without the program. To assess the welfare implications of the delayed defaults and banks' selection of safer firms, we build a dynamic model of heterogeneous entrepreneurs disciplined by our causal estimates. The program generated welfare gains 21% above its fiscal cost, with limited rents for banks and modest increases in aggregate risk-taking. Younger firms are the most cost-effective group to support, yet they are the least likely to be approved because their growth relies on leverage, increasing default risk. A budget-neutral redesign that raises guarantees for younger firms and reduces them for the rest could increase welfare by 6pp.
@unpublished{chittaro2025selection,
  author = {Lautaro Chittaro and Cristián Sánchez},
  title  = {{Selection in Crisis Lending: Evidence from Chile's Government-Guaranteed Loans}},
  year   = {2025},
  note   = {Working paper}
}